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In a recent article Professor Bork presents a vigorous and interesting
defence of vertical price fixing or resale price maintenance (hereinafter
referred to as r.p.m.).1 He argues that where it is not practiced either
in response to resellers' cartels or as part of a manufacturers' cartel,
it must be practised in the interests of greater efficiency, larger output
and improved satisfaction of consumer wants. Excluding the cases of
r.p.m. practised in response to resellers' cartels or as part of manu-
facturers' collusion, Bork says of r.p.m., inter alia, that "the economic
analysis of such restraints . . . indicates that they . . . will never be
instituted with either the intent or the effect of restricting output."'
"In the case of an individual manufacturer's imposition of restraints
upon competition among its resellers . . . the manufacturer's motive
can never be restriction of output. An alternative explanation of the
manufacturer's behavior is necessary, and the only satisfactory alterna-
tive hypothesis is that the manufacturer believes the restraint will in-
crease its net revenue by increasing distributive efficiency. This is not
to say that the elimination of competition among resellers may not
have some tendency to affect efficiency adversely .... But any such ad-
verse tendency must be outweighed by a tendency to create efficiency.
Otherwise, the manufacturer would not employ the restraint." Bork,
it should be noted, intends his conclusions to apply regardless of the
extent of monopoly power of the manufacturer.
The novelty of Bork's approach lies not in its recognition that it is
conceivable that in some circumstances the use of r.p.m. may increase
the manufacturer's sales and be of advantage to consumers, but in its
attempted demonstration that, in the absence of cartels, the use of
r.p.m. cannot fail to have this effect if adopted voluntarily and indepen-
dently by a manufacturer, that is, that it cannot have the intent or
effect of reducing output. Many who hold the view that r.p.m. in gen-
eral is against the interest of consumers nevertheless concede that there
may well be particular cases and special circumstances where the prac-
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tice may promote the interest of consumers, and therefore that in prin-
ciple a case-by-case approach by the monopoly control authorities may
be warranted. The importance of Bork's thesis is that, in a whole class
of cases, the authority would only have to establish the absence of
cartel-like behavior before it could give its approval.
I.
In this section four analytically distinct counter-examples are pre-
sented to show that r.p.m. can be practised so as to restrict output and
raise prices, thereby refuting Bork's major contention. The first coun-
ter-example shows that output can be reduced even where r.p.m.
raises the efficiency of distribution. The second shows that r.p.m. may
have the effect of reducing output even where the intention is to in-
crease it. The third shows that a monopolist manufacturer can use
r.p.m. to preserve or strengthen his monopoly position and so restrict
output. The fourth shows that each of a non-colluding group of manu-
facturers can use r.p.m. to reduce competition inter se and so restrict
output. Of the four counter-examples, the first two do not, while the
last two do, involve an increase in the extent of monopoly in manufac-
turing. None of the four depends on the presence of a cartel.
For the first counter-example suppose a manufacturer is contemplat-
ing two alternative sales strategies to secure dealer support: the first is
an expensive advertising campaign directed to retailers through trade
journals; the second is to institute r.p.m. to raise retail margins above
the competitive level. Assume that each strategy has an equal effect
on the consumer demand curve, but no effect on the degree of monop-
oly power enjoyed by the manufacturer. If we analyse this within the
framework of the standard theory of the firm the cost of the advertis-
ing campaign would be a fixed cost (i.e., independent of output) but
the increment in retail margin would be a direct addition to marginal
costs.4 Thus the marginal cost curve with r.p.m. would be higher than
that with advertising and would cut the marginal revenue curve (com-
mon to both strategies by hypothesis) at a smaller output. It is quite
possible that r.p.m. is the more profitable strategy, the more "efficient"
from the manufacturer's point of view. Nevertheless, the result is a
smaller output and a higher price to consumers.
We are not here concerned to discuss how welfare is affected in these
4. Alternatively-and with the same results-the increment in retail margin could
be treated as a reduction in the manufacturer's marginal revenues.
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circumstances. The point of the counter-example is that it destroys
the cornerstone of Bork's thesis-namely, that if r.p.m. is not intro-
duced to increase monopoly power it must be done because it improves
distributive efficiency and therefore benefits consumers through larger
output and lower prices.6 More generally, we cannot predict the effects
of an increase in efficiency in distribution (from the manufacturer's
point of view) without careful analysis of the effect on both costs and
revenues.6
The second counter-example is the possibility that each of a group
of competing manufacturers may adopt r.p.m. in a competitive attempt
to secure the support for his brands from those resellers who are in
favour of r.p.m. and prefer large unit gross margins to smaller. All
that is necessary here is that at the time such resellers should consti-
tute a large enough segment of the market, and that they individually
have enough power to influence consumer purchasers towards the
favoured brands. If each or most of the manufacturers adopted r.p.m.
for this reason, the competitive sales-increasing effect would be neu-
tralised; and, other things being equal, total sales would be smaller.
The intent behind the adoption of r.p.m. is to increase sales; the effect,
however, is to reduce sales by raising distributors' margins and con-
sumer prices. Nevertheless, it may not be in the interests of any one
manufacturer to put the process in reverse and disencumber the in-
dustry of its competitively imposed burden of higher reseller margins
and the restriction of reseller competition.
It should be noted that this counter-example does not depend on
reseller collusion or a reseller cartel. It requires no more than that
sufficient effective sales support can be bought by a manufacturer
through the medium of the introduction of r.p.m. and through the
raising of resellers' gross margins. It requires no initiative or pressure
on the part of individual resellers or concerted groups or resellers, but
only an appropriate pattern of response to inducements. (Resellers can
also, of course, make known their preference for r.p.m. without in any
way acting as a cartel.) The competitive introduction of r.p.m. is a clear
possibility where manufacturers do not agree to eschew this particular
5. Bork at 391.
6. R.p.m. may affect the demand curve; a conceivable example would be that of an
article which, via r.p.m., is placed in the class of prestige goods, a process which may
have the effect of pushing outwards the upper part of the consumers' demand curve
and making it less price elastic. This would allow the possibility that the marginal
revenue curves with and without r.p.m. intersected. In turn this permits the possibility
that the profitable institution of r.p.m. leads to a lower output.
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method of sales promotion (which like some other methods is cost-
raising but unsuccessful if generally adopted).7
The third counter-example refers to a monopolist manufacturer. It
may be in his interests to introduce r.p.m. in order to control the
structure of the distributive trade. Resale price maintenance may in-
hibit or delay the development of large-scale reseller firms. Such firms
may be in a strong position to secure price concessions from the manu-
facturer, which he would not need to give to smaller resellers; and
they may be able to introduce their own private brands in competition
with his brands. The manufacturer, therefore, would have an interest
in avoiding these effects by introducing r.p.m. and helping to preserve
the status quo in distribution." To the extent that this strategy was
successful, it would serve to reduce output and raise prices.0
The final counter-example relates to the effect r.p.m. in some cir-
cumstances may have of reducing price competition among manufac-
turers; that is, of increasing their effective monopoly power. Bork's
discussion of this issue surprisingly is limited to one type of effect
alone, that of the use of r.p.m. as a means of policing a horizontal price
agreement among manufacturers.' 0 There is another type of effect
which is analytically of more interest and empirically of more impor-
tance.
Price competition in retailing can be an independent source of in-
stability in the individual market shares of a group of oligopolistic
manufacturers. The additional instability may cause price competition
among the manufacturers (in their sales to the trade) to be more fre-
quent and intense than otherwise. Hence the manufacturers may inde-
pendently-that is, without collusion-introduce r.p.m. in the interests
7. This type of situation is not referred to by Bork, who is, hovever, at pains to
establish that "reseller pressure for a manufacturer-imposed restraint" cannot be effec-
tive "without actual reseller cartelization." Bork at 410 n.73.
8. For the same reason the members of an oligopoly group might introduce r.p.m.
without collusion. As long as each oligopolist had the same long.run apprehensions, a
follow-my-leader adoption of r.p.m. could occur. Collusion would naturally facilitate
the process; and in practice it would be virtually impossible to detect. It certainly could
not be inferred from a nearly simultaneous adoption of r.p.m., if only because the same
phenomenon would be compatible with the adoption of r.p.m. as a weapon of com-
petitive sales promotion.
9. For a discussion of a different way in which r.p.m. practised by a monopolist can
serve to preserve a monopoly position, see MoorOLsEs CosisUssION, Rn.'onr O.4 THE
SUPPLY OF WALLPAPER (1964) (especially parm. 159).
10. Bork at 411-15.
We agree with Bork's conclusion that r.pm. is unlikely to be valuable as an aid in
the policing of a manufacturers' cartel arrangement. However, the fact that its possible
use in this capacity cannot be excluded entirely (Bork at 412) weakens Bork's favourable
conclusion on r.p.m., because it would be difficult to distinguish this particular use of
r.p.m. from other uses. See note 8 supra.
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of reducing price competition inter se; the process by which this comes
about may well be analagous to that of the emergence and exercise of
non-collusive price leadership in oligopoly situations. The net result
will be a smaller industry output, which is, nevertheless, more profit-
able to the manufacturers."
The four counter-examples are sufficient to show that the univer-
sality claimed by Bork for his favourable conclusion is illusory: r.p.m.
may be adopted rationally with the intent and effect of reducing out-
put, that is, in Bork's terminology, of reducing efficiency; or it may
have this effect without it being intended. Moreover, it is not un-
realistic to claim empirical importance for the counter-examples.
II.
Professor Bork recognises that those who practice r.p.m. with the
intent of increasing efficiency may in fact be mistaken so that the net
effect is to reduce efficiency. He argues, however, that this considera-
tion should not affect his general conclusion, and says that for "a court
to strike down" r.p.m.-he takes vertical market division as his ex-
ample, but applies his observations to r.p.m. as well-"on the theory
that the manufacturer had made a mistake as to the most efficient mode
of distribution would be equivalent to judicial supervision of any other
normal business judgment,' 1 2 and should not be permitted. The argu-
ment, however, is weak.
Bork's discussion fails to recognise that r.p.m. in practice involves
the "supervision" by the manufacturer of the "normal business judg-
ment" of resellers. Resellers are not permitted to follow such price
policies as they think fit, but have to toe the line prescribed by the
manufacturer. Whatever else it may do, r.p.m. restricts the freedom
of decision of resellers. If it is improper for a court to engage in "super-
vision" of a manufacturer's decisions, it is not obvious why a manufac-
turer should be allowed to engage in the supervision of the decisions
of other business firms. Bork may reply that the resellers "agree" to this
supervision and the supervision is accepted voluntarily. Indeed at one
point he writes: ". . . The parties to each such agreement [including
vertical price-fixing agreements] are motivated by a desire for increased
efficiency. The parties, therefore, have already weighed any losses in
efficiency due to the suppression of intrabrand competition and found
11. For fuller discussion see REmsLE PICE MAINTENANC 9-12 (B. Yamey cd. 1966).
12. Bork at 404.
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them more than balanced by gains in other effciencies."' 3 Elsewhere
he refers to vertical price-fixing "agreements."14 It is unrealistic to
use such language in relation to r.p.m.; the notion that the "parties"
indulge in such deliberations is particularly fanciful. Even if all the
relevant resellers sign agreements with a price-fixing manufacturer,
this does not constitute evidence that each reseller is motivated by a
desire to improve efficiency, and that some resellers would not prefer
freedom to determine their own resale prices and do not disagree with
the manufacturer's assessment of the overall situation. Where the manu-
facturer is a monopolist, or where all or most competing brands are
price-maintained, a reseller must "agree," whatever he might think of
the restraint imposed upon him. Moreover, in many cases r.p.m. has
proved to be ineffective in practice unless it is made enforceable by
law against non-agreeing resellers. In short, a programme of r.p.m. in
practice does not involve the voluntary agreement of all parties affected,
but does involve the "supervision" and overriding by the manufacturer
of the "normal business judgment" of others.
Further, r.p.m. restrains competition among resellers and, therefore
prevents or delays changes in the distributive trades. It is, therefore,
liable to cause inefficiency in practice even where it has been intro-
duced to promote efficiency. Manufacturers introducing r.p.m. do not
know the full and detailed long-term effects of their practice on the
distributive trades. They, therefore, do not know when it would be-
come desirable for them to give up the practice in their own interests
or to modify the margins allowed to resellers.'r (In practice, moreover,
it may be difficult to give up the practice deliberately.) It is, therefore,
likely that with the passage of time r.p.m., however well-conceived
when initiated, comes to restrict output rather than to increase it.
It is important in the context that there is no automatic corrective
in the market-place. Thus, where r.p.m. covers all or the major brands
of a product or group of products, it prevents the discovery of infor-
mation relevant to a decision whether or not it increases efficiency, and
there is a reasonable possibility that in the course of time it will come
to decrease efficiency by inhibiting change. (This is, of course, quite
independent of the considerations discussed in Section I above.) The
practice, where it affects the whole or a large part of the trade in ques-
1S. Id. at 472.
14. Id. at 475.
15. In the third counter-example in Section I, see p. 725 supra, the assumed situation
is different: the manufacturer anticipates in general terms what would happen without
rp.m., and is not primarily concerned with efficiency in distribution.
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tion, serves to prevent or dilute the process of the competitive elimina-
tion of inefficient resellers and the competitive entry of innovating and
more efficient new resellers. Bork's analysis fails to take account of
these effects of r.p.m.-a neglect which would be defensible only where
r.p.m. does not affect a large part of the trade in the product or group
of products, or where the successful introduction of new brands, by
resellers or others, is easy. (And in the latter type of situation, one
would not expect to find much r.p.m.)
Thus there are grounds, apart from those set out in Section I, for
rejecting Bork's conclusions that r.p.m. "will never be instituted with
either the intent or the effect of restricting output"' 0 and that r.p.m.
is "incapable of restricting output."' It is shown that even where the
intent is to increase output, it is not unlikely that the effect will be the
opposite. Investigations have uncovered only the odd exceptional case
where it can be documented that the removal of r.p.m. caused output
of the goods to decrease rather than to increase. Manufacturers' pre-
dictions of serious reductions in sales invariably have proved to be
false. Business men may well in general be the best judges of what is
in their own interests. However, there is ample empirical evidence
to show that where their decisions restrict competition among their
customers, as in r.p.m., they generally have been wrong. This would
not matter much if their errors provoked speedy correction and did
not involve restraint of others. With r.p.m., neither condition is satis-
fied. This, it would seem, distinguishes this type of business error from
other types of business error (such as Bork's examples, errors on "as-
sembly line planning, inventory policy, [and] product design")18 when
viewed from the point of view of public policy towards monopoly and
competition.
III.
Throughout this discussion Bork's test of the harmfulness of r.p.m.
is whether it results in a smaller output. But Bork goes to some lengths
to ground this test in the theory of welfare economics by showing that,
while in perfect competition price equals marginal cost, in monopoly
price exceeds marginal cost; and thus that welfare can be increased by
transferring resources from competitive to monopolistic industries. 10
16. Bork at 475 n.207.
17. Id. at 404-05.
18. Id. at 404.
19. Id. at 592-94. Bork quotes G. J. Stigler's warning that the objection to monopoly
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What Bork did not make sufficiently clear was the restrictive nature
of the assumptions underpinning this welfare proposition. It would
be inappropriate to rehearse the necessary qualifications to this con-
clusion.20 These are numerous and their discussion highly technical
and somewhat esoteric. It is unrealistic to suppose that those entrusted
with the formulation and implementation of monopoly policy would
pay much regard to the pure theory of welfare economics, and it is
not obviously desirable that they should be required to do so. The
latter consideration applies also to an unqualified proposition such
as Bork's that the welfare test is whether or not the practice or situa-
tion increases or reduces output.
Monopoly policy need not rest on the allocative considerations dis-
cussed in the somewhat rarefied air of welfare theory. In the more
robust and rough-and-ready world of public policy other, simpler, mat-
ters are worthy of being taken into account. Again, it would be in-
appropriate to attempt here a full investigation of the possible con-
siderations. We mention two points, neglected or inadequately treated
by Bork, which seem particularly relevant in the context of r.p.m.
First, r.p.m. inhibits the freedom of resellers to experiment with
new forms of retailing. We discussed this point above when showing
that, although the manufacturer's intent might be to increase output,
the long-run effect could be the reverse. Here we would stress its more
general significance and suggest that interference with innovation and
experiment is prima facie against public policy.
Second, r.p.m. restricts the range of consumers' choice. Bork, him-
self, seems to have some misgivings about the reduction in the range
of alternatives open to consumers under r.p.m. "The preference of
any significant number of consumers for lower price instead of sales
effort or post-sale service" will "evoke a response from some pro-
ducers." 21 But even if this were so, what of those consumers who prefer
the brands which are price-maintained to all other brands, and also
prefer lower prices to post-sales service? The restriction of the range
of consumer choice is prima facie against public policy.
is not simply the restriction of output but that "productive service will have a less valu-
able marginal product in competitive than in monopolistic industries." Bork at 394
n.49. Nevertheless Bork continually writes as though the restriction of output is harmful.
But if the reduction in output occurs because marginal costs are higher than they would
be otherwise (as in our first counter-example) the divergence between price and marginal
cost may well be smaller than otherwise. We do not mean to imply that .elfare will there-
fore increase-rather that Bork did not sufficiently take to heart Stigler's injunction to
consider marginal products.
20. For a systematic examination see Mishan, A Survey of Weifare Economics, 1939-
1959, 70 TBE EcoNoMIC JoLtrNAL 197 (1960).
21. Bork at 473.
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These two considerations alone are enough to set up a presumption
that r.p.m. is against the interests of consumers. Moreover, even if we
were to disregard these considerations and accept Professor Bork's wel-
fare criterion, we have shown in Section I that his unqualified assertion
-that r.p.m., in the absence of cartels, is bound to serve the interests
of consumers-is unwarranted.
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